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Constitutional Law-CRIMINAL PROCEDURE-INDEPENDENT RIGHT
OF SELF-REPRESENTATION IN SIXTH AMENDMENT PERMITS DEFEN-
DANT TO ACT AS OWN LAWYER AT STATE CRIMINAL TRIALS
Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)
Due process of lawl requires that the state fully afford a defen-
dant his sixth amendment right to counsel2 before a valid conviction
can be obtained in a criminal prosecution.3 The aid of a lawyer is
commonly recognized as a necessity because of the complexity and
gravity of a criminal trial.4 Fundamental fairness in the guilt-
determining process 5 can only be achieved if the defendant shows
U.S. CONsT. amends. V, XIV, § 1.
2 U.S. CONST. amend. VI provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall...
have the assistance of counsel for his defense."
I The Supreme Court has announced and expanded the constitutional right of a criminal
defendant to have the assistance of counsel during the past forty years. Powell v. Alabama, 287
U.S. 45 (1932), broke ground when the Court asserted that "in a capital case, where the
defendant is unable to employ counsel, and is incapable of adequately making his own defense
because of ignorance, feeble mindedness, illiteracy, or the like, it is the duty of the court,
whether requested or not, to assign counsel for him as a necessary requisite of due process of
law .... " Id. at 71. Six years later, in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938), the Court
required that defendants be afforded counsel in all criminal cases in federal courts. The
decision set forth guidelines for determining whether defendants had validly waived their
right to counsel. Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), halted the expansion of the constitutional
right to counsel when the Court held that the fourteenth amendment does not incorporate the
specific guarantees of the sixth amendment. In Gideon v. Wainright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963),
however, the Court held that all indigent criminal defendants must be offered a lawyer in state
proceedings in order to comport with due process of law.
Most recently, Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), announced that counsel must
be made available to any criminal defendant whenever there is a possibility that the sentence
will be imprisonment. For a general discussion of the pervasiveness of the right tq counsel, see
W. SWINDLER, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN THE 20TH CENTURY: THE MODERN INTERPRETA-
TION 211 (1974).
4 As one commentator has observed:
The average defendant lacks the knowledge and skill to prepare his own defense
adequately. Thus, if he waives appointment of counsel, he may without realizing it
waive other rights as well or at least may fail to take advantage of available procedures.
I L. SILVERSTEIN, DEFENSE OF THE POOR IN CRIMINAL CASES IN AMERICAN STATE COURTS: A
FIELD STUDY AND REPORT 89 (1965). See note 7 infra.
' Professor Kadish has expounded the thesis that one of the basic objectives of criminal
procedure is to ensure the reliability and integrity of the prosecution against the accused. In
this regard he has stated:
It is not of crucial importance whether the individual tried is in fact guilty or
innocent, but it is of crucial concern that the integrity of the process of ascertaining
guilt or innocence never be impaired .... If there is any consideration basic to all
civilized procedures it is this....
Kadish, Methodology and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J.
319, 346 (1957). This jurisprudential approach is further articulated in Summers, Evaluating
and Improving Legal Processes-A Plea for "Process Values," 60 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1974).
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that he "knowingly and intelligently"6 waived his constitutional right
to the benefit of legal assistance.7 As a result, there is a presumption
against the waiver of counsel's assistance at all critical stages of
prosecution.8
A related issue emerging from the waiver of counsel cases is
whether a criminal defendant has the constitutional right to conduct
his own defense.9 Courts have considered this question, but have
disagreed in their resolution and analysis of the problem. At one
pole is United States v. Plattner,10 representing the view of four
federal circuits" and at least four states, 2 which held that the sixth
' Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938).
Justice Sutherland emphasized the value of the assistance of counsel in Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932):
[The accused] lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare his defense,
even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in
the proceedings against him. Without it, though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of
conviction because he does not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of
men of intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or those
of feeble intellect.
Id. at 69 (emphasis added).
8 In articulating guidelines for courts to use in determining whether a defendant has
waived his right to counsel, the Johnson Court observed "that 'courts indulge every reasonable
presumption against waiver' of fundamental constitutional rights." 304 U.S. at 464 (footnote
omitted), quoting Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1936); accord, Von Moltke v.
Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 70 (1942). Von
Moltke emphasized that "the strong presumption against waiver of the constitutional right to
counsel" requires the trial judge to "investigate as long and as thoroughly as the circumstances
of the case before him demand" in order to discharge his duty of safeguarding the constitu-
tional rights of the defendant. 332 U.S. at 723-24 (1948).
The circumstances under which the offer and waiver of the assistance of counsel are made
are noted by Silverstein:
It is now established that, in circumstances where the defendant is entitled to ap-
pointed counsel, he is entitled to have the appointment offered to him in an effective
and intelligible way. The things that are said, the tone of voice, the atmosphere of the
courtroom or other place where the offer is made, whether the defendant is given a
written explanation of his rights or told orally, whether by the judge, the prosecutor,
the defender, or a court official; all the matters and perhaps others affect the
defendant's decision to accept the offer of counsel or to reject it.
I L. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 4, at 89.
' See generally Grano, The Right to Counsel: Collateral Issues Affecting Due Process, 54 MINN.
L. REV. 1175 (1970); see text accompanying notes 41-74 infra.
10 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964); see text accompanying notes 50-54 infra.
" See United States v. Rosenthal, 470 F.2d 837, 844 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 909
(1972); Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056, 1058 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1021
(1969); Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100, 103 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1048
(1970); United States v. Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165, 1169-70 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 907 (1970); cf. Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 838
(1963).
12 See State v. Capetta, 316 So. 2d 749 (Fla.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1008 (1968) (pro se right
based on state and federal constitutions); Wake v. Barker, 514 S.W.2d 692 (Ky. 1974)
(historical background of sixth amendment right to counsel not a basis for invalidating right of
self-representation); People v. Henley, 382 Mich. 143, 169 N.W.2d 299 (1969), on remand, 26
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amendment implicitly grants the right of self-representation 3 in
criminal proceedings. At the other pole is People v. Sharp, 4 in which
the California Supreme Court concluded that neither the federal
nor state constitutions confer the right to conduct one's defense pro
se. Although, the Sharp approach is followed directly in only one
state,' 5 and one federal circuit, 16 at least six states, 17 and two cir-
cuits,' 8 have reached a similar result by holding that the right of
self-representation is not absolute.
The Supreme Court resolved this uncertainty in Faretta v.
California.9 In a 6-3 decision, the Court adopted the rationale of
Plattner and held that there is an independent constitutional right of
self-representation. Faretta thus recognized that a criminal defen-
dant's right of free choice requires the coexistence 20 of the constitu-
tional rights of effective assistance of counsel and self-representa-
tion at trial in criminal cases.
Mich. App. 15, 182 N.W.2d 19 (1970) (Plattner followed); State v. Mems, 281 N.C. 658, 190
S.E.2d 164 (1972) (Plattner followed); State v. Verna, 9 Ore. App. 620, 498 P.2d 793 (1972);
cf. State v. Reese, 527 P.2d 508 (Ariz. 1974) (state constitution confers right of self-
representation); Krist v. Caldwell, 230 Ga. 536, 198 S.E.2d 161 (1973) (sixth amendment right
to counsel and right to represent oneself at trial are opposite sides of same coin) (dictum);
State v. Thomlinson, 78 S.D. 235, 100 N.W.2d 121 (1960) (pro se right rooted in state
constitution and statute).
Some states have recognized the pro se right but do not offer a rationale for its existence.
The decisions simply make blanket statements without authority. See Jones v. State, 50 Ala.
App. 54"1,280 So. 2d 801,cert. denied, 291 Ala. 785, 280 So. 2d 803 (1973); Phillips v. State, 162
Ark. 541, 258 S.W. 403 (1924); Lockard v. State, 92 Idaho 813, 451 P.2d 1014 (1969);
Placencia v. State, 256 Ind. 314, 268 N.E.2d 613 (1971); Cummings v. Warden, 243 Md. 702,
221 A.2d 908 (1966); State v. Huber, 275 Minn. 475, 148 N.W.2d 137 (1967); State v. Bratton,
187 Neb. 460, 191 N.W.2d 612 (1971). Arguably, these state decisions are in harmony with
Plattner. Although the cases do not acknowledge the connection between the right of self-
representation and the sixth amendment, these courts do view the right as fundamental.
3 "Self-representation" will be used interchangeably in this Note with pro se; the latter
term means "for himself." BlACK's LAW Dic'rIONARY 1364 (4th ed. 1968).
14 7 Cal. 3d 448, 103 Cal. Rptr. 223,499 P.2d 489 (1972),cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973);
see text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
11 See State v. Frizzell, 273 So. 2d 831 (La. 1973).
16 See United States ex rel. Soto v. United States, 504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974); text
accompanying notes 61-65 infra.
17 See, e.g., People v. Lindsey, 17 111. App. 3d 137, 308 N.E.2d 111 (Ill. App. 1974); State
v. Kelly, 210 Kan. 192, 499 P.2d 1040 (1972); State v. Slicker, 342 S.W.2d 946 (Mo. 1961);
State v. Davis, 45 N.J. 195, 212 A.2d 19 (1965), appeal after remand, 50 N.J. 16, 231 A.2d 793,
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1054 (1967); People v. McIntyre, 36 N.Y.2d 10, 324 N.E.2d 322, 364
N.Y.S.2d 837 (1974); McCann v. Maxwell, 174 Ohio St. 282, 189 N.E.2d 143 (1963).
8 See Van Nattan v. United States, 357 F.2d 161, 164 (10th Cir. 1966) (right to represent
oneself is conferred by federal statute); accord, United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113,
1121-22 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (refused to reach constitutional issue).
19 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
20 Id. at 806, 834. See notes 118-26 and accompanying text infra.
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HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
IN THE UNITED STATES
The concept that a criminal defendant has a right to represent
himself at trial can be traced to attitudes and practices existing
during the colonial period.2 In legal matters, the colonists were
self-reliant 2 and distrustful of lawyers. 23 Accordingly, colonial con-
stitutions contained provisions expressly permitting "all persons of
all persuasions [to] ... freely appear in their own way, and according
to their own manner, and there personally plead their own cause
"124themselves ....
21 See, e.g., Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 821-32 & nn. 16-44; note 94 infra.
Legal scholars differ on the extent to which English practices have influenced American
constitutional development. See W. BEANEY, THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN AMERICAN COURTS 14
(1955). One commentator has emphasized that it is a fallacy to conclude that colonial law "was
essentially the common law of England, brought over to the extent applicable to colonial
condition." L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 30 (1975), citing G. HASKINS, LAW
AND AUTHORITY IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 4 ff. (1960). In fact, many American practices were
reactions against English procedures. It has been observed that, "[an] English deficiency-the
failure in certain circumstances to give a prisoner under capital accusation the benefit of
counsel for his defence-was supplied in the American Constitution by the guarantee of
counsel in all cases." C. STEVENS, SOURCES OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 232
(2d ed. 1927) (footnote omitted).
22 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 134 (1973); R. POUND, CRIMINALJUSTICE IN AMERICA
123 (1930).
23 See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 81, 265. For a discussion of the basis of this hostility
toward the bar, see id. at 82 and R. POUND, supra note 22, at 157.
24 PA. FRAME OF GOV'T OF 1682, LAws AGREED UPON IN ENGLAND VI, cited in 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 140 (1972) [hereinafter cited as
SCHWARTZ]. The Pennsylvania constitution is both the clearest assertion of the right of an
individual to represent himself, and a reaction against the Star Chamber practice of compelled
counsel. Requiring the "assistance of" counsel was also prohibited in the Carolinas and New
Jersey. See FUNDAMENTAL CONSTITUTIONS OF CAROLINA § 70 (1669), and CONCESSIONS AND
AGREEMENTS OF W.N.J., ch. XXII (1677) in SCHWARTZ 118, 129. Other pre-revolutionary
constitutions recognize the right either to represent oneself or to be assisted by a friend in
criminal trials. See MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIEs 26 (1641), and CONCESSIONS AND AGREEMENTS OF
W.N.J., ch. XXII, (1677), in SCHWARTZ 74, 129.
Colonial constitutions drafted in 1776 vary in their language concerning self-representa-
tion and the right to counsel. Maryland, New York and New Jersey provided that the
defendant "shall be allowed counsel". See MD. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XIX (1776), and
N.Y. CONST., art. XXXIV (1776), in SCHWARTZ 282, 310; cf., N.J. CONST., art. XVI (1776), in
SCHWARTZ 260. This language was later adopted in the sixth amendment. The constitutions of
Pennsylvania, Vermont and New Hampshire provided that the accused has "the right to be
heard by himself and his counsel." See PA. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. IX (1776), and VT.
DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art X (1776) in SCHWARTZ 265, 323; . N.H. BILL OF RIGHTS, art XV
(1783), in SCHWARTZ 377. THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789 contains similar wording. See note 32
infra. Only the Georgia Constitution explicitly speaks of the "inherent privilege of every free
man, the liberty to plead his own cause." See GA. CONST., art. LVIII (1677) in SCHWARTZ 300.
Five states, Connecticut, Massachusetts, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Virginia, do not
mention counsel and self-representation in their post-revolutionary constitutions.
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American colonial practices in this area evolved from the his-
tory of the legal profession and criminal procedure in England,
where, with rare exception, an accused did not have a right to the
assistance of counsel as we know it today.15 The courts of the King
compelled the defendant to represent himself, permitting counsel
only in prosecutions for high treason2 6 or for minor offenses.27 In
the notorious Star Chamber, the defendant was required to have
counsel but the assistance afforded to the accused was illusory.2 8
25 It was a very ancient principle that no counsel was allowed to persons charged with
treason or felony against the Crown; counsel were allowed in an appeal as this was
brought by a private person and not by the Crown. A slight relaxation was made in
the late fifteenth century when it became general to allow counsel to argue points of
law, which at that time were generally objections to the indictment. The origin of the
rule seems to have been the fact that counsel was hardly necessary .... [I]n Bractons
day [the thirteenth century] the court took charge of the proceedings, and viewed
indictors, prosecutors, jury and prisoner with impartial distrust. There was little that
required expert knowledge until indictments became technical documents, and when
that point was reached, counsel for arguing them was allowed almost at once. When
the use of witnesses was more dearly understood, and a technique of examining them
developed, the situation was again materially altered, and the prisoner was at a
disadvantage in attempting to cross-examine when the case for the prosecution was
sprung upon him, and his own defence still unprepared. This time the law did not
bring its own corrective, and made little attempt for a long time to meet the changed
circumstances.
T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 434-35 (footnote omitted) (5th ed.
1956). See also 5 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAw 192 (2d ed. 1937).
These historical reasons for prohibiting counsel did not exist in the American colonies, so
criminal lawyers did practice in many colonial courts. See W. BEANEY, supra note 21, at 14-18.
Even the practice of appointing counsel in some cases took root in the colonies. See, e.g., id.; W.
NELSON, AMERICANIZATION OF THE COMMON LAW, 226-27 n.140 (1975) (discussing extent of
this practice in Massachusetts). Although the American courts did not follow the English
practice of limiting the assistance of counsel in criminal cases, the common law left an
important legacy to early American criminal law that influenced the criminal lawyer's role.
Like its British counterpart, American criminal law was administered locally, often by non-
professionals. See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 37-40, 44-45. Consequendy, criminal law
remained rudimentary in its substance and relatively simple in its procedure. See S. MILsoM,
HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE COMMON LAw 353-74 (1969). As a result, although counsel
might have proved helpful, justice did not require it. Hence, the practice of self-representa-
tion could continue.
26 In 1696 a revolutionary bill was passed by Parliament allowing the assistance of counsel
to persons on trial for high treason-offenses against the royal family or the government. 7 &
8 Will. 3, c. 3 (1696). This protection was not expanded in England until 1836, long after the
colonial period, when another Act of Parliament granted the accused the right to counsel in
felony cases. 6 & 7 Will. 4, c. 114 (1836). See T. NORTON, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 220 (1922); SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 252-53 (R. Perry ed. 1972).
27 Minor offenses, or misdemeanors, included libel, perjury, and battery. It has been
suggested that counsel was permitted because the state had little interest in these cases. W.
BEANEY, supra note 21, at 8.
2S The Star Chamber was the only tribunal that required the accused to have counsel.
However, this assistance was not for the benefit of the defendant, but rather served as a means
of coercing a confession. The prisoner was expected to admit his guilt and a variety of devices
were used to achieve this end. For example, upon being served an indictment, the defendant
was required to return an answer signed by his counsel. If the answer was false or offended
the Crown, the attorney was subject to rebuke, suspension, fine, or imprisonment. As a result,
10231976]
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Therefore, the English experience with counsel was slight. Con-
sequenfly, the colonists' memory of the Star Chamber practices
coupled with their belief in the abilities of the individual2 9 and their
scorn of lawyers resulted in the practice of self-representation. This
was not only custom,30 but also a necessity because of the shortage of
lawyers. 31
The codification of this practice of self-representation in this
country can be traced to the Judiciary Act of 1789.32 One day after
George Washington signed the statute into law, the Bill of Rights
was introduced in Congress. 3 Language specifically guaranteeing a
right of self-representation is noticeably absent from the sixth
amendment which has been characterized as "a compact statement
of the rights necessary to afull defense. 34 The drafting of the sixth
amendment certainly was not meant to preclude the prevalent colo-
nial practice, but it also could not anticipate the changes in the
character of the American legal system and the legal profession
during the subsequent two hundred years. The significance of this
counsel was careful about what he signed and often did not defend his client with much
enthusiasm. Moreover, the Star Chamber viewed an unsigned answer, regardless of the
reason, as a confession. As a consequence, the role of counsel in the Star Chamber did not
promote the idea that assistance of counsel would be beneficial. W. HOLDSWORTH, supra note
25, at 178-79 (2d ed. 1937); 1 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 341
(1883).
29 This is exemplified by the advantageous pro se defense. Through his demeanor,
questions, and interactions with the Witnesses, the defendant offered evidence that the court
had no other means of obtaining. However, this strategy lost its value when the rules of
evidence changed and permitted a party to testify on his own behalf. Cf. W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 25, at 192-95; E. JENKS, A SHORT HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 343-44 (1912). For a
discussion of the contemporary analogue, see Comment, Self-Representation in Criminal Trials:
The Dilemma of the Pro Se Defendant, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 1479, 1505-07 (1971) [hereinafter cited
as Self-Representation].
10 Custom generally took the form of a localized and non-professional system of criminal
law. In Massachusetts, for example, most criminal matters were tried before Justices of the
Peace appointed for each county. Like most other judges in the county, these judges were
laymen. See W. NELSON, supra note 25, at 15, 32-33 (1975). But see E. POWERS, CRIME AND
PUNISHMENT IN EARLY MASSACHUSETTS 438-39 (1966) (counsel appointed in some important
cases). Additionally, most of the colonies allowed counsel at criminal trials. See note 25, supra.
"' See L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 21, at 81; Note, Law in Colonial New York. The Legal System
of 1691, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1757, 1770-71 (1961) (New York Bar had only 15 to 20 lawyers
in 1691).
32 Section 35 of the JUDICIARY ACT states:
[I]n all courts of the United States, the parties may plead and manage their own
causes personally or by the assistance of such counsel or attorneys at law as by the
rules of the said courts respectively shall be permitted to manage and conduct causes
therein.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 35, 1 Stat. 73, 92.
33 422 U.S. at 831.
14 Id. at 818 (emphasis added).
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omission is the crux of the constitutional issue.35 It is of particular
importance in those jurisdictions where neither the state constitu-
tion nor a statute confers the right of self-representation.
In its modern form, the Judiciary Act grants all criminal defen-
dants the right to conduct their own defense in federal courts.3 6 In
addition, the constitutions of at least thirty-seven states have provi-
sions conferring this right.3 7 These provisions fall into two catego-
ries. The first type duplicates the language of the federal act; 38 the
second type does not generally require the defendant to choose
between self-representation and the assistance of counsel, because
both are permitted.39 However, judicial construction has altered the
apparent meaning of the constitutional provisions. 40
Both state and federal courts have faced the problem of ad-
judicating the scope of the right of a criminal defendant who seeks to
conduct his own defense. 41 The self-representation issue has always
35 Id. at 818-19, 831-32, 850-51. Justice Blackmun discussed the problem in his forceful
dissenting opinion:
The Sixth Amendment expressly constitutionalized the right to assistance of counsel
but remained conspicuously silent on any right of self-representation. The Court
believes that this silence of the Sixth Amendment as to the latter right is evidence of
the Framers' belief that the right was so obvious and fundamental that it did not need
to be included "in so many words" in order to be protected by the Amendment. I
believe it is at least equally plausible to conclude that the Amendment's silence as to
the right of self-representation indicates that the Framers simply did not have the
subject in mind when they drafted the language.
Id. at 850. See also Self-Representation, supra note 29, at 1489.
" The statute provides:
In all courts of the United States the parties may plead and conduct their own cases
personally or by counsel as, by the rules of such courts, respectively, are permitted to
manage and conduct causes therein.
28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) (emphasis added).
" See notes 38-39 infra.
38 See, e.g., KAN. CONST. § 10; MAss. CONST. Pt. 1, art. 12; NEB. CoNsr. art. 1, § 11.
a See, e.g., Asuz. CONST. art. 2, § 24; ARK. CONsr. art. 2 § 10; COLO. CONST. art. 2, § 16;
CONN. CONST. art. 1, § 8; DEL. CONST. art. 1, § 7; IDAHO CONST. art. 1, § 13; IL. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8; IND. CONST. art. 1, § 13; Ky. CONST. § 11; Mo. CONsT. art. 1, § 18(a); Mor. CONST. art.
2, § 24; NEv. CONST. art. 1, § 8; N.M. CONST. art. 2, § 14; N.Y. CONST. art. 1 § 6; N.D. CONST.
art. 1, § 13; OHIO CONST. art. 1, § 10; OKLA. CONSr. art. 2, § 20; ORE. CONST. art. 1, § 11; PA.
CONST. art. I, § 9; R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 10; S.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 14; S.D. CONST. art. 6, § 7;
TENN. CONrST. art. I § 9; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 12; VT. CONST. c.1, art. 10; WASH. CONST. art. 1,
§ 22; Wis. CONST. art. 1, § 7; WYo. CONST., art. 1, § 10. These states grant the accused the right
to be heard, or to defend in person and by counsel. Other states grant the defendant the right
to defend either by himself, by counsel, or both. See, e.g., ALA. CONSr. art. 1, § 6; FLA. CONST.
art. 1, § 16; ME. CONST. art. 1, § 6; MIss. CONSr. art. 3, § 26; S.C. CONsT. art. 1, § 18; TEx.
CONST. art. 1, § 10.
40 See text accompanying notes 71-74 infra.
41 See notes 10-12, 14-18 and accompanying textsupra. Although data on the number of
criminal defendants choosing to represent themselves at trial in state courts is unavailable, it
may be inferred that most seek the assistance of counsel. One indicia is the general experience
of the federal courts: an exhaustive survey of pro se litigants revealed that they comprise 20%
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encompassed the full spectrum of crimes, 4 2 but the "political" trials43
of the last decade brought the issue into national focus. Equally
diverse are the reasons defendants have given for wanting to proceed
pro se." Consequently, courts facing the question have dealt with a
complex array of factors. The rules formulated by the courts are an
attempt to accommodate the needs of both defendants and judges.45
When faced with addressing the constitutional question, state
and federal courts had little Supreme Court precedent upon which
to rely. The Court had focused on the scope of the right to the
of the annual caseload in these courts. See Zeigler & Hermann, The Invisible Litigant: An Inside
View of Pro Se Actions in the Federal Courts, 47 N.Y.U.L. REv. 157 (1972). Another indicia is the
increasing number of defendants using lawyers under the CRIMINALJUSTICE ACT OF 1964, 18
U.S.C. § 3006A (Supp. IV, 1974), amending 18 U.S.C. § 3006A (1970). See 1969 ADMIN. OFFICE
OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANN. REP. 11-34, and Appendix on Payments made under the Criminal
Justice Act, cited in Sef-Representation, supra note 29, at 1479 n.5; U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING
OFFICE, ADMINISTRATION OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE ACT BY THE U.S. COURTS AND THE D.C.
SUPERIOR COURT 3 (1974). However, the last months of 1975 saw increasing numbers of
criminal defendants representing themselves. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 9, 1975, 1, at 13, col. 1.
Most notable was Lynette "Squeaky" Fromme, who was convicted of attempting to assassinate
President Ford.Id. For a discussion of her conduct at trial, see TIME, Nov. 10, 1975, at 43, and
id. Nov. 17, 1975, at 62.
42 See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (burglary and
destruction of private property); United States v. Pike, 439 F.2d 695 (9th Cir. 1971) (failure to
submit to induction); United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400
U.S. 930 (1970) (fraudulent preparation of federal income tax forms); State v. Mems, 281
N.C. 658, 190 S.E.2d 164 (1972) (rape); State v. Verna, 9 Ore. App. 629, 498 P.2d 793 (1972)
(kidnap of former wife).
"' See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Seale v. Hoffman,
306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. Ill. 1969), rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Seale, 461
F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972). Viewed as an arm of the system they distrust, court-appointed
counsel is often rejected by defendants in "political" trials. See T. HAYDEN, TRIAL 99 (1970);
Self-Representation, supra note 29, at 1498-1507.
4' Basic assumptions about the value of assistance by counsel are challenged when a
defendant insists on self-representation. This is highlighted in those cases where the defen-
dant entertains the belief that he will be more effective than a lawyer because he is more
familiar with the facts (see e.g., Burstein v. United States, 178 F.2d 665 (9th Cir. 1950); United
States ex rel. Davis v. McMann, 386 F.2d 611, 620 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 958
(1968)), or because he wishes to evoke the jury's sympathy (see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Helwig,
184 Pa. Super. 370, 378, 134 A.2d 694, 698 (1957); People v. Chessman, 38 Cal.2d 166, 178,
238 P.2d 1001, 1008 (1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 915 (1952)). This is also true when a
defendant lacks confidence in his attorney. See, e.g., Moore v. United States, 432 F.2d 730 (3d
Cir. 1970).
The JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW & CRIMINOLOGY conducted a survey of Illinois trial judges
to assess their experience with pro se defendants. Comment, The Right to Appear Pro Se: The
Constitution and the Courts, 64J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 240, 248-49 (1973). This appears to
be the only published survey-that focuses on the attitude of trial judges and prosecutors. The
survey also examines the treatment and success at trial of such defendants. In addition to
those reasons already discussed, five judges believed that the choice of the typical litigant "was
an expression of his egotism or .... the result of the defendant's 'belief in his superior intellect
[and the] general stupidity of the court and attorneys .... ' Id. at 248.
" See notes 10-15 supra.
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assistance of counsel and the standards for ascertaining whether a
valid waiver had been made.46 As a result, only occasional dicta
mentioned thepro se defense.47 Even the decision containing the best
discussion of the issue, Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,48 does
not make a clear distinction between the rights and privileges of
criminal defendants necessary to an understanding of the constitu-
tional issue. 49
The earliest definitive judicial pronouncement of the constitu-
tional right of self-representation came in the 1964 case of United
States v. Plattner. 50 The issue arose when the defendant appealed the
district court's determination that he had to be represented by
counsel in a coram nobis proceeding because of his inadequate legal
background. 51 Without Plattner's knowledge or consent, the district
judge assigned a legal aid lawyer. The defendant, believing he
would be more successful if he presented his own case, sought to
waive this assistance. 52 Relying on Adams, 53 the Second Circuit re-
versed the district court's ruling, and held that Plattner should have
46 See notes 3-8 supra.
47 For example, Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948), dealt with a prisoner who wished
to appear personally in the oral argument of his habeas corpus petition because he believed
"the case is of such a nature that only he himself can adequately discuss the facts and issues."
Id. at 280. In permitting the prisoner to appear on his own behalf, the Court contrasted its
decision with the "constitutional prerogative of being present in person at each significant
stage of a felony prosecution... [and] his recognized privilege of conducting his own defense
at trial." Id. at 285 (emphasis added).
Cases discussing standards for waiving the right to counsel have also provided dicta. In
Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946), the Court said: "Neither the historic conception of Due
Process nor the vitality it derives from progressive standards of justice denies a person the
right to defend himself.... Under appropriate circumstances the Constitution requires that
counsel be tendered; it does not require that under all circumstances counsel be forced upon a
defendant." Id. at 174-75; accord, Von Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 724 (1947).
In Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934), the Court stated that "the defendant has
the privilege under the Fourteenth Amendment to be present in his own person whenever his
presence has a relation reasonably substantial, to the fullness of his opportunity to defend
against the charge." No one can be substituted to exercise these faculties for him." Id. at 105
(alleged murderer does not have right to join the jury in viewing the scene of the crime).
48 317 U.S. 269 (1942). Adams dealt with the standards for waiving a jury trial in a
felony case in which the defendant represented himself. The Court adopted the "knowingly
and intelligently" language employed in the right-to-counsel cases and added dicta pertaining
to pro se defendants like Adams.
411 See id. at 279-80. Although the Court stated that "(t]he right to the assistance of counsel
and the correlative right to dispense with a lawyer's help are not legal formalisms" (id. at 279),
it stopped short of calling self-representation a "right" by referring to the defendant's "privi-
leges." Id. at 280. Throughout the case, the only right explicitly recognized is the right to
counsel.
50 330 F.2d 271 (2d Cir. 1964).
51 Id. at 273.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 275.
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been permitted to proceed pro se since this right arises "out of the
Federal Constitution and [is] not the mere product of legislation or judicial
decision."54
Although the Sixth,55 Seventh,56 and Ninth57 Circuits have also
adopted this position, the Third, 58 Eighth,59 and District of Colum-
bia60 Circuits have rejected it. The Third Circuit decision of United
States ex rel. Soto v. United States6a  is characteristic of the latter
group.62 As in Plattner, the petitioner claimed that the trial judge
54 Id. at 273 (emphasis added). The rationale of the decision was that the Framers
inclusion of a right to counsel provision in the sixth amendment was
not intended to limit in any way the absolute and primary right to conduct one's own
defense in propria persona. Nor is the existence of this right made doubtful by the
circumstances that the now all but universal requirement of the assignment of
counsel to indigent defendants is the development of a later generation and more
enlightened views. Indeed, and strangely enough, there would probably have been
no denial of Plattner's right to act pro se had the Court not been so accustomed in
these recent years to assign Legal Aid counsel or other lawyers to defend those
indigent defendants ......
Id. at 274 (footnotes omitted).
" See, e.g., United States v. Sternman, 415 F.2d 1165 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S.
907 (1970).
H See, e.g., Lowe v. United States, 418 F.2d 100 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1048
(1970).
57 See, e.g., Arnold v. United States, 414 F.2d 1056 (9th Cir. 1969).
58 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Soto v. United States, 504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974). See
text accompanying notes 61-65 infra.
'9 See, e.g., Butler v. United States, 317 F.2d 249 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 838
(1963).
60 See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113 (D.C. Cir. 1972). In this case, five
of the nine defendants sought to waive their court-appointed counsel in order to proceed pro
se in their trial for burglary and malicious destruction of property. Because of the political
nature of the trial (the crimes arose from an anti-Vietnam War protest), the district court held
that a fair trial could only be assured if all the defendants were represented by counsel. The
District of Columbia Circuit reversed on the ground that 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) creates an
unqualified right, not subject to the discretion of the trial court. The opinion, however,
avoided reaching the constitutional issue, even though it was raised by the parties. Id. at 1122.
The Dougherty case provides an excellent analysis of the statutory basis of the pro se right
and extensively marshalls authority in its discussion of the sources of that right. The case has
further significance because it discusses the effect of a defendant's disruptive behavior at trial
on his right to proceed pro se.
61 504 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1974).
62 At least two circuits, the Fifth and the Tenth, have refused to follow Plattner. They,
however, do not follow the Soto rationale either. For example, in Van Nattan v. United States,
357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1966), the defendant appealed his conviction for unlawfully entering a
federally insured bank with the intent to commit a felony under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1970). In
seeking reversal, he argued that the assistance of a court-appointed counsel was forced upon
him in violation of his sixth amendment rights. The Tenth Circuit employed a two-step
analysis. First, relying upon 28 U.S.C. § 1654 and Rule 44 of the FED. R. CRIM. PRO.,
mandating assignment of counsel, it refused to adopt the Plattner approach, concluding that
the right of self-representation was only statutory. Id. at 163-64. Second, the court found that
Van Nattan had not intelligently waived his right to counsel, and therefore could not assert the
statutory right. Id.
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committed reversible error by assigning counsel and failing to in-
form him of his right to defend pro se. The court concluded that as
self-representation is statutory and not a constitutional right, trial
judges have no duty to inform defendants that they may represent
themselves. 63 In contrast to the Plattner court's view that the right to
defend pro se is a correlative of the right to assistance of counsel,64
Soto found that it "is only tangentially related to procuring a fair
trial".6 5
The disagreement among the courts of appeals is dwarfed by
the range of state court decisions. 66 These opinions have dealt with
permutations of statutory and state constitutional schemes, 67 in addi-
Although trial judges have broad discretion in determining whether the statutory right of
self-representation may be exercised, the Van Nattan decision is significant because it outlined
an additional rationale denying the right to proceed pro se. It suggests that courts should not
focus on the defendant's efforts to assert the § 1654 right, but instead requires judges to
analyze the facts in order to ascertain whether the accused made a valid waiver of the right to
counsel. As a result of the presumption against the waiver (see note 8 supra), few defendants
will meet the Van Nattan standard. Cf., Seale v. Hoffman, 306 F. Supp. 330 (N.D. 111. 1969)
rev'd on other grounds sub. nom. United States v. Seale, 461 F.2d 345 (7th Cir. 1972); United
States v. Mitchell, 137 F.2d 1006 (2d Cir. 1943).
The position of the Fifth Circuit is not clear. In Juelich v. United States, 342 F.2d 29 (5th
Cir. 1965), the court specifically declined to address the constitutional issue. When the case
reached the court of appeals, it had already gone through a complex procedural path in
Juelich's attempts to appeal his murder conviction. Judge Rives found that the district court
correctly exercised its discretion when it denied Juelich's motions to represent himself or to
assist court-appointed counsel. The court recognized that the Fifth Circuit and otherjurisdic-
tions had previously recognized that defendingpro se is a constitutionally protected right, but
refused to afford Juelich the right as the proceeding was already beyond trial. Id. at 31-32.
By contrast, the often cited case of MacKenna v. Ellis, 263 F.2d 35 (5th Cir. 1959), held
that a mentally competent unrepresented defendant who was required to accept inexperi-
enced and incompetent counsel was denied due process of law. The case was cited byJuelich
for the proposition that the Fifth Circuit recognizes a right of self-representation. An analysis
of MacKenna, however, reveals that it also holds that a criminal defendant has the right to
effective assistance of counsel. Consequently, a conservative reading of these Fifth Circuit
opinions leads one to conclude that the right of self-representation is available only when
required in the interest of justice. This interpretation vests discretion in the trial judge for
determining the availability of the pro se right.
13 504 F.2d at 1341. The distinction between a constitutional and a statutory right has
significant procedural consequences. For example, a statutory right is deemed waived if not
exercised, and there is generally no duty on the part of the trial judge to affirmatively offer it
to the defendant. Id. at 1344. Furthermore, if a statutory right is not exercised, the defendant
must demonstrate prejudice in order to have his conviction reversed. Id. See also Brown v.
United States, 264 F.2d 363, 365-66 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 911 (1959); Comment,
July Nullification and The Pro Se Defense: The Impact of Dougherty v. United States, 21 KANSAS L.
REv. 47, 63-64 (1972); Note, The Right to Defend Pro Se In Criminal Proceedings, 1973 WASH.
U.L.Q. 679, 705-07.
64 330 F.2d at 275.
65 504 F.2d at 1343.
66 See notes 12, 14-15 & 17 supra.
67 Id. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 686, 686.1, 859 (West 1954) construed in People v.
Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233,499 P.2d 489 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973),
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tion to analyzing the sixth amendment. State v. Verna 68 is a good
example of those cases finding the right of self-determination
rooted in both state and federal constitutions. The Oregon Court of
Appeals faced the issue of whether the trial court committed rever-
sible error by failing to honor the defendant's intelligent and compe-
tently asserted election to proceed pro se. The court construed the
relevant provision of the state constitution69 as conferring a right of
self-representation, and expanded the scope of its holding by citing
Plattner for the proposition that the right also arises out of the sixth
amendment. 70
Another approach is illustrated by People v. Sharp, 71 which con-
strued the sixth amendment and sections of the California constitu-
tion and penal code. As in United States v. Plattner, the trial court
denied the defendant's motion to proceed pro se because it was clear
that an attorney would be better qualified to conduct the defense. 72
Sharp appealed the conviction on several grounds; most signi-
ficantly, he claimed that the court committed prejudicial error in
denying his constitutional right to self-representation. In arriving at
its decision, the California Supreme Court unanimously asserted:
In almost 200 years of constitutional interpretation and construc-
tion the [United States] Supreme Court has not on any occasion
held that the right of self-representation in a criminal trial is
constitutionally compelled.
Therefore, we cannot confer upon the right of self-
representation. . . a status which is automatically fundamental to a
fair trial.73
The Sharp decision does not differ substantially from Soto in its
rationale. Sharp, however, is noteworthy because the California con-
stitutional provision7 4 was analogous to the section of the Oregon
provision construed in Verna.
The inconsistent results reached by the courts presented
sufficient confusion to warrant a resolution of the issue. In 1974 the
Supreme Court granted certiorari 75 to an unreported case, People v.
with S.D. CODE 34.2905(1) (1960), as amended, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 23-2-7 (1967),
construed in State v. Thomlinson, 78 S.D. 235, 100 N.W.2d 121 (1960) and MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 28.854 (1972 Rev'd), construed in People v. Henley, 382 Mich. 143, 169 N.W.2d 299 (1969).
68 9 Ore. App. 620, 498 P.2d 793 (1972).
69 ORE. CONST. art I, § 11.
70 9 Ore. App. at 625, 498 P.2d at 796.
71 7 Cal. 3d 448, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233,499 P.2d 489 (1972),cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
72 Id. at 452-53, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 234-35, 499 P.2d at 490-91.
7 Id. at 457, 460, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 238, 241, 499 P.2d at 494, 497.
71 CALIF. CONST. art. I, § 13.
75 415 U.S. 975 (1974).
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Faretta, 76 which duplicated the rationale and approximated the fact
pattern of Sharp.
II
Faretta v. California
Almost half a century ago Charles Evans Hughes wrote:
[T]he protection both of the rights of the individual and of those
of society rests not so often on formulas, as to which there may be
agreement, but on a correct appreciation of social conditions and a
true appraisal of the actual effect of conduct.77
Faretta v. California78 represents the Court's continuing effort to
make an accommodation between the rights of the criminal defen-
dant as an individual and society's mandate for efficient criminal
adjudication machinery.
Procedural safeguards that are geared towards preserving the
integrity of criminal proceedings have encountered much criti-
cism. 7 9 However, they have also been hailed as the hallmark of the
American legal system. As Justice Brennan once observed, "respect
for the individual . .. is the lifeblood of the law."80
When Anthony Faretta moved to represent himself in a prose-
cution for grand theft in the Los Angeles Superior Court,8' the
court initially granted permission.8 2 However, before trial,8 3 the
judge reversed his decision on two grounds. First, the defendant's
76 2d Crim. No. 22722 (Cal. Ct. App., 2d App. Dist., Div. 2, filed June 26, 1973). For a
copy of the unreported opinion, see Petition for Certiorari, Appendix at 25, Faretta v.
California, 402 U.S. 806 (1975).
77 C. HUGHES, THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 165-66 (1928).
78 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
79 See People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 23-24, 150 N.E. 585, 587-88 (Cardozo, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926); M. SHAPIRO & R. TRESOLINI, AMERICAN CON-
STITUTIONAL LAw 649 (4th ed. 1975); Note, Where is the Constitutional Right to Self Representation
and Why is the California Supreme Court Saying all Those Terrible Things About It?, 10 CALIF. W.L.
REv. 196, 206-07 (1973).
80 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 350-51 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring), cited in Faretta
v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
81 -422 U.S. at 807. Faretta sought to represent himself because he believed that the public
defender's office was "'loaded down with ... a heavy case load.'" Id.
82 In granting Faretta's motion, the judge informed the defendant:
You are going to follow the procedure. You are going to have to ask the
questions right. ... We are going to give you every chance, but you are going to play
with the same ground rules that anybody plays. And you don't know those ground
rules.
Id. at 808 n.2. The Supreme Court characterized this "preliminary ruling" as an acceptance of
the defendant's waiver of the right to counsel. Id. at 808.
83 The superior court judge, on his own motion, held a hearing to assess Faretta's ability
to conduct his own defense. Id.
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demeanor and answers to specific legal questions8 4 indicated that
Faretta did not intelligently and knowingly waive 'his right to coun-
sel. Second, the trial judge concluded that under the rule of People v.
Sharp,85 the pro se defense is a privilege, and not a fundamental
constitutional right.86 It was therefore within the discretion of the
court to appoint a public defender to represent Faretta at trial.87
The majority in Faretta, 8 8 speaking through Mr. Justice Stewart,
considered the case in terms of the voluntary and competent elec-
tion of an accused seeking to make a procedural choice during
his trial.89 Graphically framing the issue, the Court questioned
"whether a State may constitutionally hale a person into its criminal
courts and there force a lawyer upon him, even when he insists that
he wants to conduct his own defense." 90 In responding, the Court
held that the sixth amendment implicitly grants a defendant the
constitutional right to represent himself.91
In reaching its decision, the Court considered the intent of the
Framers of the Constitution against a backdrop of English criminal
84 The questions concerned the hearsay rule and California law governing the challenge
of potential jurors. Id.
85 7 Cal. 3d 448, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, 499 P.2d 489 (1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 944 (1973).
See text accompanying notes 71-74 supra.
86 7 Cal. 3d 460-61, 103 Cal. Rptr. 240-41, 499 P.2d at 496-97.
87 Faretta subsequently requested leave to act as co-counsel, moved to have counsel of his
choice, and to have a lawyer other than the public defender appointed. All of these motions
were rejected. Id. at 810 & n.5. The petitioner argued that the right of self-representation is
necessitated by the fact that a defendant does not have the right to choose counsel. See
Petitioner's Brief at 21-23, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). The Court ignored this
issue.
88 The remaining members of the "Warren Court," Justices Brennan, Stewart, Douglas,
Marshall, and White, joined by Justice Powell, comprised the Faretta majority.
89 The opinion begins with a recital of dicta from Adams v. United States ex. rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269 (1942), Carter v. Illinois, 329 U.S. 173 (1946), Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97 (1934), and Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266 (1948). See note 47 supra. These cases are
marshalled for their language acknowledging the right to appear on one's own behalf. See 422
U.S. at 814-17. However, it is better to view them as authority for the majority's "right of free
Choice" analysis. See text accompanying notes 103-05 infra. Adams and Snyder exemplify
successful arguments of defendants winning the opportunity to make choices affecting the
course of their trial: Adams involved the right to waive ajury trial, and Snyder upheld the right
of a defendant to be present at a critical stage of the proceedings against him-a visit by the
jury to the scene of the crime. Carter is cited because of its approval of the Adams dicta.
Ironically, Carter held that Illinois could constitutionally accept a defendant's waiver of counsel
and his subsequent guilty plea.
Price is cited because of its language contrasting the absence of an absolute right to argue
one's appeal with the "recognized privilege of conducting [one's] own defense at the trial." 334
U.S. at 285 (emphasis added). The -words "rights" and "privileges" are used imprecisely
throughout these opinions, thereby diminishing their value as authority.
80 422 U.S. at 807.
91 Id. at 834.
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procedure and American colonial history.92 Although the historical
record is inconclusive, 93 the Court inferred that, in drafting the
explicit sixth amendment right to counsel, the Framers did not
intend to eliminate "the long-respected right of self-repre-
sentation. '94 The Court supported its position by asserting that
there would have been some debate in Congress95 if the sixth
amendment was intended to change "centuries of consistent his-
tory"96 of self-representation.
Although it conside'red the dicta of Adams v. United States ex
rel. McCann controlling, the majority did not come to grips with the
strong dicta of Singer v. United States, 97 adopted by the dissent, 98 and
generally recognized as a major obstacle to the recognition of a
constitutional pro se right.99 Central to the Singer decision, which
involved the waiver of another sixth amendment right-the right to
a jury trial-was the assertion that "[t]he ability to waive a consti-
tional right does not ordinarily carry with it the right to insist upon
the opposite of that right."'100 The Sharp court considered this lan-
guage dispositive when it concluded that "the right to waive a con-
stitutional protection is not itself necessarily a right of constitutional
dimensions."' 01
92 Id. at 821-32. The majority opinion asserted that "[t]he right of self-representation
finds support in the structure of the Sixth Amendment, as well as in the English and colonial
jurisprudence from which the Amendment emerged." Id. at 818.
'3 See notes 23-24, 27 & 35supra. The briefs of the parties reflect varied interpretations of
the historical record. See Brief for Petitioner 33-34; Brief for Respondent 17-31; Petitioner's
Reply Brief 1-4, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975). Case law analyzing colonial history
and English jurisprudence has reached different conclusions. Compare United States v. Platt-
ner, 330 F.2d 271, 274 (2d Cir. 1964), with People v. Sharp, 7 Cal. 3d 448, 454, 103 Cal. Rptr.
233, 236, 499 P.2d 489, 492 (1972). Commentators have also disagreed in their interpretation
of history relating to the sixth amendment. See Note, supra note 63, at 685; Grano, supra note
9, at 1192-93; Self-Representation, supra note 29, at 1487; W. BEANEY, supra note 21, at 24.
94 422 U.S. at 832.
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 380 U.S. 24 (1965).
98 422 U.S. at 841 n.4, 847. The dissenters correctly assert that Singer stands for the
proposition that even though there is a constitutional right to ajury trial which may be waived,
it does not follow that there is an absolute constitutional right to be tried by a judge sitting
alone. Furthermore, the Singer court stated that "it has long been accepted that the waiver of
constitutional rights can be subjected to reasonable procedural regulations .... " 380 U.S. at
35.
The application of Singer to the self-representation issue suggests that even though an
accused may waive his constitutional right to counsel, waiver does not necessarily imply the
right of self-representation. Moreover, it follows from Singer that the trial court is vested with
discretion to accept or reject the waiver of explicit sixth amendment rights. Id.
" See, e.g., Self-Representation, supra note 29, at 1488; 24 HASNGS L.J. 431, 438-39
(1973).
100 380 U.S. at 34-35.
1 7 Cal. 3d at 455, 103 Cal. Rptr. at 237, 499 P.2d at 493.
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Perhaps the Faretta Court felt that its historical justification of
the self-representation right was sufficient to overcome the analyti-
cal problems posed by Sharp. And in a moment of self-reflection, the
majority acknowledged that the right to counsel and the right of
self-representation might be contradictory. 10 2 The Court, however,
concluded that although recent case law mandates that all criminal
defendants be afforded a lawyer before a conviction will be deemed
valid, there exists
a nearly universal conviction, on the part of our people as well as
our courts, that forcing a lawyer upon an unwilling defendant is
contrary to his basic right to defend himself if he truly wants to do
so.1
0 3
Therefore, the majority analyzed the problem in terms of its
conception of fundamental American values. It concluded that a
criminal defendant's right of free choice has priority over the gov-
ernment's interest in the administration of justice. As long as the
accused can show that he is aware of the personal consequences of
his choice, he may exercise his constitutional right of self-represen-
tation. 1 04
Led by Chief Justice Burger, the strict constructionists clearly
demonstrated their constitutional methodology and philosophy'0 5
in two forceful dissenting opinions.' Rather than consider the
rights of the individual, the dissenters questioned whether "the
interests of justice"' 0 7 require the right of self-representation. Chief
Justice Burger asserted that the Supreme Court has an obligation to
assess the impact of new constitutional rights on the criminal justice
system. He then suggested that the right of self-representation will
add to the "congestion in the courts and that the quality of justice
will suffer."' 0 8
Beginning with an analysis of the language of the sixth amend-
ment, Justices Burger and Blackmun each reasoned that there is no
102 422 U.S. at 832.
103 Id. at 817.
104 The majority asserted:
Personal liberties are not rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is
personal. The defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal
consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be free
personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his advantage.
Id. at 834.
"' Cf., Kurland, 1970 Term: Notes on the Emergence of the Burger Court, 1971 Sup. CT. REv.
265, 321; L. LEvY, AGAINST THE LAw 25-35 (1974).
10' Justice Blackmun wrote the second dissenting opinion. Id. at 846-50. Justice
Rehnquist concurred in both dissents.
107 422 U.S. at 807 n.I.
"I Id. at 845.
1034 [Vol. 61:1019
1976] RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 1035
independent basis in the Constitution for detecting the existence of
the right of self-representation. 0 9 Rather, they found that the
right-to-counsel cases manifest an opposite conclusion: that the
"spirit and the logic" of the sixth amendment require that all crimi-
nal defendants receive the fullest possible defense. 110 Thus, accord-
ing to the dissents, a fair trial is best achieved when the accused
exercises his fundamental right to counsel."' In the alternative, a
valid waiver should only be accepted when, in the exercise of discre-
tion, the trial judge, finds that the accused is able to conduct his own
defense and is fully aware of the consequences." 2
The dissenters also rejected the majority's method of historical
analysis. Justices Burger and Blackmun both argued persuasively
that the majority opinion failed to prove that the Framers intended a
constitutional right of self-representation. 1 3 Justice Blackmun,
109 Id. at 837-40, 846-49.
110 Id. at 840.
' This is also the position of the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice
Standards and Goals. In Standard 13.1 they asserted:
Defendants should be discouraged from conducting their own defense in crimi-
nal prosecutions. No defendant should be permitted to defend himself if there is a
basis for believing that:
1. The defendant will not be able to deal effectively with the legal or factual issues
likely to be raised;
2. The defendant's self-representation is likely to impede the reasonably expeditious
processing of the case; or
3. The defendant's conduct is likely to be disruptive of trial process.
NATIONAL ADvIsoRY COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, COURTS 253
(1973).
112 Although the dissenters superficially appear to evaluate the problem in terms of the
best alternative for the individual defendant, their result reveals a primary concern for the
best interests of the criminal justice system. Moreover, contrasting those interests balanced by
the majority and the dissenters in reaching their conclusions further supports this point. For
the majority, the considerations are the right of free choice or the unjust conviction. 422 U.S.
at 834. The dissent, however, balanced the possibility of unjust convictions with the interests of
the state. Id. at 851. This latter position is indicated in Chief Justice Burger's opinion when he
states:
In short, both the "spirit and the logic" of the Sixth Amendment are that every person
accused of crime shall receive the fullest possible defense .... Truefreedom of choice and
society's interest in seeing that justice is achieved can be vindicated only if the trial court
retains discretion to ... insist that the accused be tried according to the Constitution.
Id. at 840. (emphasis added).
Justice Blackmun echoes this position in asserting: "I cannot agree to such a drastic
curtailment of the interest of the State in seeing that justice is done in a real and objective
sense." Id. at 851.
"' Id. at 843-45, 850-51. The dissenters, therefore, base their reasoning on a strict
reading of the Constitution. They pay particular attention to the right to counsel expressly
granted by the sixth amendment and the due process clause. In evaluating the self-
representation problem, the dissenters reason that a case-by-case determination of each defen-
dant's attempt to defendpro se is the best means of affording a fair trial and achieving due process
of law.
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however, went further when he demonstrated that the use of history
is wholly inappropriate.1 1 4 He theorized that regardless of the
genesis of the sixth amendment, contemporary notions of funda-
mental fairness in criminal justice adjudication must prevail in con-
stitutional analyses." 5 Moreover, he argued that the customary
practice of self-representation by colonial Americans has no bearing
on the existence of a constitutional right of self-representation in
1975 because of changes in criminal procedure.
The conclusion of Justice Blackmun's dissenting opinion poses
serious questions about the impact of this new constitutional right on
criminal procedure." 6 Thus, the dissent's analysis, with its stress on
the practical aspects of the administration ofjustice, is characteristic
of the Burger-Blackmun-Rehnquist approach to constitutional is-
sues." 7 It focused on the interests of society, the other party af-
fected by the free choices of criminal defendants.
III
PROCEDURAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF SELF-REPRESENTATION
A. Hybrid Representation
In recognizing the constitutional dimensions of the right of
criminal defendants to represent themselves at trial, the Supreme
Court has diminished the exclusiveness of the explicit sixth amend-
"4 Id. at 850-51.
I " Id. at 851. He reasoned that the majority's recognition of the constitutional right of
self-representation creates "obvious dangers of unjust convictions in order to protect the
individual defendant's right of free choice." Id. Such a possibility, argued Justice Blackmun,
countervenes the right of a fair trial. Id. This echoes Justice Burger's assertion that "Ct]he
system of criminal justice should not be available as an instrument of self-destruction." Id. at
840.
116 Some of the questions include:
Must every defendant be advised of his right to proceed pro se? If so, when must that
notice be given?. .. How soon in the criminal proceeding must a defendant decide
between proceeding by counsel or pro se? Must he be allowed to switch in midtrial?
May a violation of the right to self-representation ever be harmless error?
Id. at 852.
"1 See generally Lamb, The Making of A Chief Justice: Warren Burger on Criminal Procedure
1956-1969, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 743 (1975). This concern with the pragmatic aspects of the
criminal justice system has been vigorously attacked:
[T]he Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one
might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause in
particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable
citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may charac-
terize praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than mediocre
ones.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972).
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ment right to counsel."" Unless the Court subsequently recognizes a
hybrid right where the defendant may proceed pro se, with an
attorney assisting as co-counsel, an election between the rights of
self-representation and the assistance of counsel will probably have
to be made. Pre-Faretta case law does not present a clear analysis of
the problems inherent in proceeding in this manner. 1 9 Faretta,
however, does alter the perspective on the co-counsel problem be-
cause the Court recognized that two constitutional rights are as-
serted and/or waived. Instead of questioning only whether the de-
fendant may appear in the capacity of counsel with his attorney, the
inquiry is more complex. First, there are constitutional questions:
What is the scope of the waiver of counsel's assistance when the
defendant exercises the pro se right? If the right of self-representa-
tion is asserted, has the trial court necessarily recognized the waiver
of the assistance of counsel, and consequently, co-counsel? Because
the Court has not resolved the practical procedural problems of
asserting and waiving these rights, 20 the constitutional dimensions
of the co-counsel hybrid' 2' are unclear. Second, statutory provisions
I18 The Court has thus recognized that the basic thesis of the right-to-counsel de-
cisions-that the assistance of a lawyer is essential to assure a fair trial-is not without
exceptions. Faretta's brief emphasized that the scheme for assigning counsel in California
resulted in deficient representation for many defendants. California's Code of Criminal
Procedure does not grant indigent defendants the right to counsel of their choice. Moreover,
California law will not overturn a conviction on the grounds of ineffective assistance of counsel
unless the quality of representation was so poor as to render the trial a sham. See Brief for
Petitioner at 21-28, Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806; Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 812.
Therefore, the right of self-representation was the necessary remedy for the inadequate legal
services. Although the majority's language of "the right of free choice" is the basis of its holding,
the problem of providing adequate representation seems to be the real issue involved.
"9 Although there have been circumstances where defendants sought the assistance of
counsel and also wanted to present the case themselves there is little precedent in this area.
Nevertheless, the discernible standard for permitting co-counsel is whether or not the "inter-
ests of justice" require it. See Overholser v. DeMarcos, 149 F.2d 23, 26 (D.C. Cir.), cert denied,
325 U.S. 889 (1945). Angela Davis, who was charged with conspiring to provide weapons to
black militants held in the Mafin County, California Civic Center, was also permitted to
appear as co-counsel at her trial. See Self-Representation, supra note 29, at 1506 (discussion of
her successful arguments to appear as co-counsel). For a discussion of Texas law on this point,
see Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780, 784 n.2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), a case decided after
Faretta.
120 See text accompanying notes 127-35 infra.
121 Several cases rejecting the right to proceed pro se and retain a co-counsel have been
decided since the Faretta decision. United States v. Swinton, 400 F. Supp. 805 (S.D.N.Y. 1975);
People v. Windham, - Cal. App. 3d -, 129 Cal. Rptr. 828, 833-34 (1976); Callahan v. State,
- Md. App. -, 354 A.2d 191, 194-95 (1976). See also United States v. Hinderman, 528 F.2d
100 (8th Cir. 1976) (no constitutional right to have unlicensed attorney represent defendant);
United States v. Lang, 527 F.2d 1264 (4th Cir. 1975) (no constitutional right for defendant to
appear as co-counsel if right to counsel is asserted); United States v. Corrigan, 401 F. Supp.
795 (D. Wyo. 1975) (no constitutional right for other lay counsel to represent defendant).
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must be considered. The federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1654,122 has
been construed to require an election between being represented by
counsel or proceeding pro se. 123 Relying on Faretta's "right of free
choice" language, a court could construe this statute to permit a
defendant to represent himself with an attorney serving as co-
counsel, even though the statute is worded disjunctively. In addi-
tion, Faretta does not address the constitutionality of proceeding pro
se with the assistance of co-counsel in state courts. State statutory and
constitutional provisions are diverse a24 and have been inconsistently
construed; 25 therefore, it can be expected that application of Faretta
will be equally inconsistent.
It also remains for the Supreme Court to articulate the bound-
aries of the pro se defendant's right to have the assistance of standby
counsel. Advisory counsel has been used in the past when the trial
judge has doubted the ability of the pro se defendant to present his
case or where the accused could not receive a fair trial without
counsel's assistance.' 26 When a defendant waives his right to coun-
sel, only presentation of the defense by an attorney at trial is waived.
Therefore, a defendant conceivably may consult a lawyer, seated
with him at the table, and not overstep the bounds of the asserted
right of self-representation. Moreover, Faretta explicitly states that it
is appropriate for a state to compel a defendant to accept standby
counsel, "even over objection by the accused [in order] to aid ...
[him] if and when ... [he] requests help, and to be available to
represent the accused in the event that termination of the defen-
dant's self-representation is necessary."' 27
122 See United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1976); see note 36supra.
123 Brasier v. Jeary, 256 F.2d 474 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 867, rehearing denied, 358
U.S. 923 (1958).
124 See notes 38-39 & 67 supra.
12. See text accompanying notes 68-70 supra.
126 See Self-Representation, supra note 29, at 1510. In his concurring opinion in Mayberry v.
Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971), Chief Justice Burger asserted that assigning advisory
standby counsel is in the best interest of the pro se defendant:
Here the accused was acting as his own counsel but had a court-appointed lawyer as
well. This suggests the wisdom of the trial judge in having counsel remain in the case
even in the limited role of a consultant. When a defendant refuses counsel, as he did
here, or seeks to discharge him, a trial judge is well advised-as so many do-to have
such "standby counsel" to perform all the services a trained advocate would perform
ordinarily by examination and cross-examination of witnesses, objecting to evidence
and making closing argument. No circumstance that comes to mind allows an accused
to interfere with the absolute right of a trial judge to have such "standby counsel" to
protect the rights of accused persons "foolishly trying to defend themselves"....
Id. at 467-68. Because of his misconduct during his trial, Mayberry was convicted for criminal
contempt. Commentators have also recommended hybrid representation by using advisory
counsel and lawyers as co-counsel. See Note, The Pro Se Defendant's Right to Counsel, 41 U. GiN.
L. REv. 927, 940 (1972); 24 HASTINGS L:J. 431, 451 (1973); Note, supra note 63, at 703.
127 422 U.S. at 834-35 n.46, citing United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1124-25
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B. Time for Asserting the Pro Se Right
Faretta does not establish concrete guidelines for the defendant
who wishes to exercise the right of self-representation. The opinion
does reiterate the "knowingly and intelligently" standard 128 which
must be demonstrated in order to effect a valid waiver of counsel.
However, a discussion of the specific steps which defendahts must
take is noticeably absent. Nor is there mention of the duties of trial
judges, prosecutors, or court-appointed counsel. Faretta specifically
addresses only the pre-trial assertion of the right to proceed pro se.
The controversial problem of permitting a defendant who has re-
tained counsel, to dispense with such assistance and represent him-
self once the trial has begun, 29 is not discussed at all. 130
C. Waiver
The manner in which a defendant may waive the pro se right if
he exercises his right to counsel is also unclear.' 3 ' United States v.
Plattner, however, established guidelines on these procedural
points,132 and there is nothing in Faretta to suggest that they are
(D.C. Cir. 1972). Although discussion of standby counsel is limited to a footnote, and focuses
on a fact pattern involving a potentially disruptive defendant, there is nothing in Faretta to
exclude liberal use of standby counsel. Cases decided since Faretta, in which courts approve or
require standby counsel, include United States ex rel. Konigsberg v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131 (2d
Cir. 1975); Stepp v. Estelle, 524 F.2d 447 (5th Cir. 1975); United States v. Corrigan, 401 F.
Supp. 795, 800 (D. Wyo. 1975); Thomas v. Superior Court, 54 Cal. App. 3d 1054, 1059-60,
126 Cal. Rptr. 830, 833-34 (1976) (dictum); People v. Heath, 35 Ill. App. 3d 880, 882, 342
N.E.2d 452, 456 (1976); People v. Heidelberg, 33 Ill. App. 3d 574, 592-93, 338 N.E.2d 56,
70-71 (1975); Commonwealth v. Africa, - Pa. -, 353 A.2d 855, 864 (1976).
128 See 422 U.S. at 832, citing Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464-65 (1938). Also see Von
Moltke v. Gillies, 332 U.S. 708, 723-24 (1948) (plurality opinion of Black, J.). For post-Faretta
cases treating the standard for assertion of thepro se right, see United States ex rel. Konigsberg
v. Vincent, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975); United States ex reL Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750
(2d Cir. 1975); United States v. Johnson, 527 F.2d 1104 (4th Cir. 1975); Demos v. State, -
Ala. -, 329 So. 2d 646 (1976); People v. McCoy, 35 Ill. App. 3d 326, 341 N.E.2d 422 (1976);
State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 347 A.2d 219 (1975); Hamilton v. State, 30 Md. App. 202, 351
A.2d 153 (1976); State v. Hartman, - Vt. -, 349 A.2d 223 (1975).
129 See Comment, supra note 63, at 48-50; Comment, Defense Pro Se, 23 U. MIAMI L. REv.
551, 558 (1969).
"'0 But see People v. Windham, - Cal. App. 3d -, 129 Cal. Rptr. 828, 831-32 (1976)
(court must grant request for self-representation even after trial begins); State v. Nix, - La.
-,327 So. 2d 301,353-54 (1976) (motion to discharge counsel after selection ofjury refused).
131 Butsee United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1976) (plea bargaining
of public defender with defendant's consent constituted waiver ofpro se representation); State
v. Nix, - La. -, 327 So. 2d 301, 354 (1976) (retention of counsel beyond commencement of
trial constituted waiver).
132 330 F.2d at 276. For example, Plattner required that a clear record of the defendant's
choice to proceedpro se be made through a recorded colloquy with the presiding judge; accord,
Hodge v. United States, 414 F.2d 1040 (9th Cir. 1969). A dissentingjudge inHodge stated that
the procedure for accepting a waiver should be similar to those steps a trial judge must take
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inappropriate. Moreover, the Court lent some aid on this issue by
declaring:
Although a defendant need not himself have the skill and experi-
ence of a lawyer in order competently and intelligently to choose
self-representation, he should be made aware of the dangers and
disadvantages of self-representation so that the record will estab-
lish that "he knows what he is doing and his choice is made with
eyes open."'133
It is questionable, however, whether the "eyes are open" standard is
appropriate for measuring the validity of an assertion of the pro se
right.13 4
Faretta implies judges should notify the pro se defendant that he
will not be afforded special treatment during the trial. 135 All rules,
such as the rules of evidence, must be followed. And since the pro se
defendant has full responsibility for his defense strategy, Justice
Stewart declared that he is precluded from collaterally attacking his
conviction on the ground that he had the ineffective assistance of
counsel.1
36
before iccepting a guilty plea. 414 F.2d at 1054. He added that "the more apparent the
stupidity which attends ones's insistence upon providing his own juice in which to stew, the
more careful should be the trial judge in the required explanation of the factors involved in
the attempted waiver." Id. at 1054-55. These elements are also discussed in Note, The Pro Se
Defendant's Right to Counsel, 41 U. CIN. L. REv. 927, 935-38 (1972).
133 422 U.S. at 835, quoting Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 279
(1942).
134 The same standard is used-in assessing the validity of a waiver of counsel's assistance.
Perhaps, however, a higher standard should be required in electing to proceed pro se because
the defendant's ability to manage his own defense may affect the outcome of his trial.
Although the Faretta Court recognizes that legal knowledge is unnecessary for the defendant
exercising his right of self-representation (422 U.S. at 835), his ability to conduct his own
defense is a matter that the Court did not adequately examine. The level of the defendant's
education, intelligence, knowledge of law, and experience with legal proceedings may have
significant bearing on the defendant's success. See, e.g., United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973
(2d Cir. 1972). These factors, however, are not determinative of whether the defendant may
represent himself. Id.
A recent New York decision interpreting Faretta held that the standard for determining
mental capacity to stand trial was the same as that for determining capacity to waive the right
to counsel and to elect to proceedpro se. People v. Reason, 37 N.Y.2d 351,334 N.E.2d 572,372
N.Y.S.2d 614 (1975). The Second Circuit has also addressed this question. See United States ex
rel. Martinez v. Thomas, 526 F.2d 750 (2d Cir. 1975); and United States ex rel. Konigsberg v.
Vincent, 526 F.2d 131 (2d Cir. 1975). In Konigsberg the court held that the standard of
competence for pro se representation is higher than that needed to stand trial. A Maryland
court has also decided this question. See State v. Renshaw, 276 Md. 259, 347 A.2d 219 (1975)
(standard for pro se representation different from standard of competency to stand trial).
13 See 422 U.S. at 835 (discussing with approval conduct of trial judge). See also United
States v. Plattner, 330 F.2d at 276; People v. Heidelberg, 33 Ill. App. 3d 574, 338 N.E.2d 56
(1975) (prisoner may not expect special treatment while conducting own defense); In re
Brewster, - N.H. -, 351 A.2d 889 (1975) (rules of procedure identical for those appearing
pro se). But see Self-Representation, supra note 29, at 1508.
136 Id. at 835 n.46.
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There are at least two possible explanations for the majority's
lack of specificity in discussing procedural standards for implement-
ing the right. Although the Supreme Court has previously struck
down or affirmed criminal procedures and formulated guidelines in
the same opinion, 13 7 the Faretta majority may have believed that
the better approach was to reserve discussion to future cases. If
Faretta stands for the recognition of a new fundamental constitu-
tional right, Justice Blackmun's procedural questions 13 8 must be
answered. However, the case may also be viewed as a warning to
courts that they must let defendants do something they have always
been allowed to do-represent themselves. Although the right-to-
counsel cases have espoused the theory that representation by a
lawyer is essential to a fair trial, resources have not been adequately
allocated to assure all defendants such assistance.' 39 Therefore,
Faretta is a limitation on post-Gideon cases insofar as it asserts that "it
is not inconceivable that in some rare instances, the defendant might
in fact present his case more effectively by conducting his own
defense."' 40 Procedural guidelines are not of primary importance if
one reads Faretta as a judicial answer to the problems arising out of
the right-to-counsel cases.
IV
RETROACTIVITY
The Faretta Court did not declare that the decision should
receive retroactive application. Nevertheless, within seven months
after the opinion was handed down, at least two state courts14 and
two federal courts142 addressed this question.
The Michigan Supreme Court was the first and only court to
assert that Faretta should be given retroactive effect. 43 In People v.
Holcomb, 144 the opinion reasoned that
137 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 486 (1966).
138 See note 116 supra.
139 Id. at 805.
140 Id. at 834.
141 People v. McDaniel, 16 Cal. 3d 156, 127 Cal. Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d 843 (1975); People v.
Holcomb, 395 Mich. 326, 235 N.W.2d 343 (1976).
142 United States v. Montgomery, 529 F.2d 1404 (10th Cir. 1976); Houston v. Nelson,
404 F. Supp. 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1975). The Montgomery case is not discussed infra as it did not
discuss the retroactivity of Faretta in state proceedings. The case held that a court that denies a
defendant his right to proceed pro se under 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1970) has committed reversible
error.
143 People v. Holcomb, 395 Mich. 326, 235 N.W.2d 343, 347 (1976).
144 395 Mich. 326, 235 N.W.2d 343 (1976).
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[t]he right to representation at trial, whether by counsel or by the
defendant himself, affects the truth and accuracy of the guilt
determining process.
To deny retroactive effect to the right to proceed pro se on the
ground that the right to counsel at trial enhanced the reliability of
the fact-finding process while the right to proceed pro se inhibits or
lessens the probability that the defendant's case will be adequately
presented would be to reject the premise of Faretta .... 145
The court did not explicitly employ the test, articulated in several
oft-cited Supreme Court cases, 14 6 for assessing whether a decision
should be retroactively applied. Instead the Michigan court em-
phasized:
In Sixth Amendment terms, the right to proceed pro se is not
qualitatively different from the right to counsel and accordingly,
unless and until the United States Supreme Court limits the appli-
cation of that right, we will accord it full retroactive effect. 147
The Holcomb court therefore ignored the language in Faretta clearly
recognizing a qualitative difference between the right to counsel and
pro se representation. 148 By misreading Faretta, the Michigan Su-
preme Court reached a conclusion that is divergent from other cases
addressing the same question.
People v. McDaniel14 9 and Houston v. Nelson 150 both explicitly
applied the Supreme Court's retroactivity test and concluded that
Faretta should be applied only prospectively. In McDaniel, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court evidenced its discontent with the pro se right
when it declared:
In considering the first of criteria of retroactivity of the
Faretta rule, we discover that it is readily apparent- that the pur-
pose of the rule is to secure to an accused the personal freedom to
145 Id. at 336, 235 N.W.2d at 347 n.7.
146 See, e.g., Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967); Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). InHalliday, the court summarized the
test:
In deciding whether to apply newly adopted constitutional rulings retroactively,
we have considered three criteria: (1) the purpose of the new rule; (2) the extent of
reliance upon the old rule; and (3) the effect retroactive application would have upon
the administration of justice.
394 U.S. at 832. Although the Holcomb majority considered the purpose of the new rule, it
failed to consider the other two criteria. Moreover, it misunderstood the purpose of pro se
representation because it did not recognize that the right has nothing to do with the accuracy
of the guilt-determining process; in fact, the Supreme Court emphasized that the right of an
individual to exercise free choice was at issue in Faretta (422 U.S. at 832-34).
147 395 Mich. at 336, 235 N.W.2d at 347 n.7.
148 422 U.S. at 832-34.
149 16 Cal. 3d 156, 127 Cal. Rptr. 467, 545 P.2d 843 (1976).
,59 404 F. Supp. 1108 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
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choose how and by whom he will defend against a criminal charge.
It is manifest from... the Faretta opinion ... that compliance with
the rule is not intended by the majority of the court in Faretta to
enhance the reliability of the truth-determining or fact-finding
process, as the majority anticipate and indeed concede, that such
compliance will most likely have the directly opposite effect. 151
Both McDaniel and Houston recognized that California law af the
time of the appellant's trials clearly prohibited the right of self-
representation. 52 Moreover, the trial courts were justified in their
reliance on pre-Faretta law. Finally, McDaniel and Houston em-
phasized that the retroactive application of Faretta could have trau-
matic effects on the administration of justice.153
Courts therefore should follow the sound analysis of McDaniel,
since both this opinion and Houston adequately assessed the ramifica-
tions of the retroactive application of Faretta. Indeed, some courts
have already indicated that Faretta has had a traumatic effect on the
"administration of justice.' 54 Liberal acceptance of standby counsel
151 16 Cal. 3d at 166, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 473, 545 P.2d at 849.
152 Id at 167, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 474-75, 545 P.2d at 849-50; 404 F. Supp. at 1115.
153 16 Cal. 3d at 167-68, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 474, 545 P.2d at 850; 404 F. Supp. at 1115. The
opinions both posited situations where those convicted under pre-Faretta law could readily
seek redress. In Houston v. Nelson, the court stated: "Any defendant who at one time requested
to represent himself on the record in a state court criminal proceeding could file for a new trial
and under the rationale of U.S. v. Price [474 F.2d 1223 (9th Cir. 1973)], no prejudice need be
shown, only an unequivocal demand." 404 F. Supp. at 1115. The California Supreme Court
commented:
The final criterion, the effect of retroactive application of the Faretta rule upon
the administration of justice, surely swings the scales heavily against retroactive
application. Such application could require that convicted persons who unsuccess-
fully sought at trial to assert a right of self-representation be accorded a new trial
wherein they might appear pro se. As we must assume that in each such instance the
right of self-representation was denied because the accused was not competent to so
represent himself (see People v. Sharp, 7 Cal.3d 448, 461, 103 Cal. Rptr. 233, 499 P.2d
489 (1972)) or did not have an intelligent conception of the consequences of waiving
counsel (seePeoplev. Siegenthaler, 7 Cal.3d 465, 471, 103 Cal. Rptr. 243, 499 P.2d 499
(1972)), it is manifest that on retrial in the great majority of cases a different result
would not be forthcoming. The state would thus be heavily burdened to retry
numerous cases with little likelihood that justice would be served in any of them.
16 Cal. 3d at 167-68, 127 Cal. Rptr. at 474, 545 P.2d at 850.
154 See notes 126-27 and accompanying text. A California court has graphically com-
mented on the decision:
The dragon's teeth sowed by Faretta have begun to sprout.
Of course, as the dissent in Faretta pointed out, the Sixth Amendment doesn't say
beans about self-representation, but the majority says that the "structure" of the
Amendment so indicates and that, to coin a phrase, is that."
People v. Windham, 58 Cal. App. 3d 570, 572-73, 129 Cal. Rptr. 828, 830 (1976). The case
involved a defendant who sought to represent himself for the balance of his testimony, and for
the final argument. The trial judge had denied the request without any inquiry as to whether
the defendant knew what he was doing. On appeal, Justice Gardner held that under Faretta,
the trial judge's ruling was reversible error per se. 16 Cal. App. 3d at 576, 129 Cal. Rptr. at
832-33.
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and co-counsel shows that courts are attempting to accommodate
the basic constitutional right to counsel to the self-representation
right. When courts employ these devices, which aid the pro se defen-
dants in conducting their defenses, they are in effect proving that
the right of self-representation is not intertwined with the truth-
determining process.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court, in Faretta v. California, recognized
that the sixth amendment contains both the explicit right to counsel
and the implicit right to self-representation. It is a departure from
the line of cases holding that a criminal defendant can receive a trial
that comports with the requirements of due process of law only if
represented by counsel. The Faretta court reasoned that a defen-
dant must have the best possible defense at trial, but it must not be at
the expense of the free choice of the individual.
The Court, however, did not define the limits of the pro se right
and failed to articulate procedural standards for its exercise. There-
fore, courts, defendants, and lawyers affected by the case will have
to rely on older lower court decisions, and interpretations of Faretta
by state and circuit courts until the Supreme Court again speaks
about the right of self-representation.
Aileen R. Leventon
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